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T
he Fed acts as the lender of last
resort when financial market 
distress makes it difficult for
banks to obtain the short-term loans that
help finance their operations. That is,
the Fed lends U.S. dollars to U.S. banks.
But what happens when the banks in
need of dollar-denominated funds are
located abroad?
The Fed typically has no direct means
of lending to foreign financial institu-
tions, yet many foreign banks hold U.S.
dollar-denominated assets and liabilities, and thus have
occasional need to borrow from and lend to other banks in
U.S. dollars. When financial markets recently grew nervous
about the fiscal positions of Greece and other European
countries and the exposure of financial institutions to trou-
bled sovereign debt, investors charged a higher premium to
extend funding to those institutions, including in dollars,
risking a disturbance to financial and economic activity.
That's why in May the Fed reopened a “currency swap”
program with five central banks to help them act as lender of
last resort in their respective countries — in dollars. The
swap lines work like this: The Fed sells a quantity of dollars
to a foreign central bank, and in payment receives an equal
quantity in foreign currency at the prevailing market
exchange rate. Simultaneously, the Fed and the foreign 
central bank agree to trade the funds back at a date agreed
upon in advance, between one day and three months later.
The second transaction reverses the first. But over the 
duration of the swap, the foreign central bank is free to use
the funds to make dollar-denominated short-term loans to
banks in its jurisdiction.
The currency swap lines were previously launched in
December 2007 to address the financial crisis, but had been
allowed to expire in February 2010 after interbank dollar
funding markets improved. Initially, the swap lines were
used because investors feared counterparties’ exposures to
securities related to subprime mortgages in the United
States. Those assets were often denominated in U.S. dollars,
and for foreign banks a large portion was financed through
interbank dollar funding markets. When interbank lending
became strained, these institutions had to either find 
alternative sources of dollar funds or sell the assets under
chaotic market conditions, which potentially could have
contributed further to their already plunging prices. 
European Union, United Kingdom, and Swiss banks’ 
dollar exposures on their balance sheets exceeded $8 trillion
in 2008, report New York Fed economists Linda Goldberg,
Craig Kennedy, and Jason Miu. Foreign
banks were hit especially hard when 
activity in private U.S. dollar interbank
lending markets slowed because they were
more dependent on those markets than
American banks. U.S. financial institu-
tions are relatively flush with dollars —
the denomination of a majority of their
assets as well as their deposit base — and
could tap into dollar backstop financing,
including from the Fed, when needed. 
So, while actions that eased global finan-
cial distress were surely beneficial for U.S. institutions, the
swap lines were not really created to benefit U.S. banks, note
Michael Fleming and Nicholas Klagge, also of the New York
Fed, in an April 2010 summary of the swap program. 
The swaps carry little direct risk to the Fed. There is no
exchange rate risk since the loans are made and reversed
using the same exchange rate. And though the funds are
intended to be loaned to private institutions, the foreign
central bank assumes any risk that loans will default, deter-
mining independently which institutions are able to borrow
and what types of collateral they can borrow against. 
Similar swap lines were launched following the terrorist
attacks of 9/11, in a coordinated effort by several central
banks to keep global financial markets operational. In fact,
other forms of swap agreements were in place from 1962 
to 1998, though those existed mainly to facilitate central
banks’ interventions in foreign exchange markets to affect
exchange rates — which the Fed rarely does today.
The recent swap lines will play only a supporting 
role in easing the European financial market strains, noted 
Brian Sack of the New York Fed in a June speech. The 
policy actions of European governments toward debt will do
the heavy lifting. Indeed, little of the dollar-denominated
funds have actually been exchanged with the five central
banks involved relative to the amount traded during 
the financial crisis. (At the program’s peak in December
2008 swaps outstanding comprised more than a quarter 
of the Fed’s total assets.) Still, the swap lines may be impor-
tant in reassuring creditors that dollar funding is available, 
as central banks hope to head off further dollar liquidity
shortages. 
“The swaps were essentially put in place in a preemptive
manner, under the view that their presence would provide 
a backstop for dollar funding markets and help to bolster 
market confidence,” Sack said. To firmly establish confi-
dence that dollar liquidity will be available, the swap lines
will be kept open until January 2011. RF
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